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Abstract
Spin-off policy is one of the crucial issues in the 
Indonesian Islamic Banking Act (The Act of 21/2008). 
This paper is going to evaluate the spinoffs criteria that 
are inherent in the Act of 21/2008. The method that has 
been used in this paper to evaluate the spinoffs criteria is 
ARIMA and simulation. This ARIMA method is used 
to forecast that the Islamic banking unit can achieve the 
fifty percent asset after fifteen years after this act. The 
object that is used in this paper is four Islamic spin-off’s 
banks, five Islamic banking units, and two Islamic full-
fledged banks. The ARIMA result shows that from all 
of the objects in fifteen years or the year of 2023, there 
are no Islamic banks either Islamic full-fledged banks 
or Islamic banking unit can achieve the fifty percent 
asset. Besides that, based on the simulation it needs 
high growth asset to achieve the market share asset of 
its parent’s banks. According to these results, this study 
suggests the regulator should revise the spinoffs criteria 
using the strict criteria that based on either nominal 
assets, capital, financial ratio or the others.
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INTRODUCTION
There now exist a growing literature about the spin-off, 
but only several kinds of research discuss Islamic bank’s spin-
off. The Islamic bank’s spin-off was first practiced in Indonesia. 
This spinoff is what makes the research about Islamic bank’s 
spin-off become a unique practiced in the Indonesian Islamic 
banking industry. According to the Islamic Banking Law No. 
21 of 2008, there are two types of Islamic banks in Indonesia, 
namely; Islamic full-fledged banks and Islamic business unit 
(Islamic unit of conventional banks).
As we know, the regulation about Islamic bank’s spin-off 
in Indonesia is based on Law No. 21 of 2008 verse 68. In this law, 
the Islamic business unit of conventional banks must spin-off if 
they had fulfilled the criteria, such as the Islamic business units 
has reached 50% of the parent bank’s assets or 15 years after the 
Law No. 21 of 2008 is applied. After this law had applied, the 
regulator (Bank of Indonesia) forced some Islamic business unit 
to do the spinoffs, although they had not reached yet one of the 
criteria (voluntary spin-off. Because there is no Islamic business 
unit that able to met the criteria.
There is still a debate over the impact of spin-off on the 
performance of Islamic banks. Some studies suggest that spin-
offs have a positive impact on the performance, such as: deposit 
funds (Nasuha, 2012; Al Arif, 2014) and profitability (Hamid, 
2015). While some other studies show the opposite effect, such 
as: total asset (2015c), total financing (2015a), and efficiency (Al 
Arif, 2015b). Haribowo (2017) and Al Arif, et.al (2017) suggest 
that the spin-off policy should evaluate. This difference then led 
to a research gap whether the spin-off criteria is correct or not. 
In this paper, we try to contribute to the empirical studies 
about the spin-off criteria evaluation. According to this spin-
off’s criteria, this paper is going to evaluate if this criterion is 
correct or if the criteria need to evaluate. This paper is going 
to do a mid-term evaluation of spin-off policy. Besides that, 
this research is trying to offer the other criteria that suitable for 
the Islamic bank’s spinoff. The Islamic bank’s spinoff model in 
Indonesia can become a role model for Islamic banks spinoff in 
other countries; this is another contribution that is offered in this 
paper. The difference between this paper and previous studies 
(such as: Haribowo, 2017; Al Arif, et.al, 2017), this study focused 
on the evaluation of spin-off criteria in some sample banks. 
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This study found that the sample banks (such as: four spin-off’s 
banks, one Islamic business unit owned by state owned banks, 
two Islamic business units owned by regional development 
banks, two Islamic business units owned by private banks, 
and two Islamic full-pledge banks) can’t achieve the 50% of the 
parent bank’s assets.
One target of the spinoff policy is to achieve the 5% Islamic 
bank’s market share. This objective planned tobe achieved in 
2008, but until 2015 the goalstill couldn’t be achieved. Data in 
table 1 shows that the spinoffs policy still can’t accelerate the 
growth of Islamic banking industry faster than the growth of 
conventional banks. After the enactment of Law, No.21 of 2008 
appeareda new trend establishment of Islamic banks through the 
mechanism of acquisitionand conversion of conventional banks 
into Islamic banks. The implementation can be done through 
three approaches, namely: First,  conventional  commercial 
banks that already had Islamic banking unit acquiresa 
relatively small bank and then convert it into a full Islamic 
commercial banking, thereby releasing as well as incorporating 
Islamic banking unit with the newly converted bank. Second, 
conventional commercial banks that do not havean Islamic 
banking unit,acquired a relatively small bank and convert it 
into an Islamic commercial bank. Third, theconventional bank 
separation (spinoffs) and used asa separate Islamic Banks.
Table 1. The Market Share Growth of Indonesia Islamic Banking 
Industry
Year Islamic banks
(millionUS$)
Conventional banks
(millionUS$)
Market share
(%)
2003 604.53 92,743.01 0.65
2004 1,160.08 96,673.46 1.20
2005 1,582.69 111,457.47 1.42
2006 2,026.20 128,240.61 1.58
2007 2,759.95 149,997.18 1.84
2008 3,721.96 173,923.22 2.14
2009 4,991.15 191,232.00 2.61
2010 7,255.94 223,948.77 3.24
2011 10,737.93 269,797.31 3.98
2012 14,330.36 312,889.92 4.58
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2013 17,616.34 362,476.23 4.89
2014 18,054.87 431,934.62 4.18
2015 21,810.67 455,337.69 4.79
Source: Islamic Banks Statistics, Bank of Indonesia
Assumption: US$ 1 = IDR 13,000
The growth of the Indonesian Islamic banking industry 
had decreased in the last three years. Data in Table 2 shows 
that although the deposit funds, financing, and asset are still 
increasing in nominal.The growth is decreases from 2012 
until 2014. The highestgrowthoccurred in the year2011. The 
data showed that the spinoffs policy that was imposed by the 
regulator still doesn’t have a direct impact in accelerating the 
growth of the Indonesian Islamic banking industry.
Another problem that occurred in the Indonesian Islamic 
banking industry, especially after the spinoffs policy that was 
forced by the regulator is at the financial ratio of Islamic banking 
industry. One reason why the regulator forced some Islamic 
business unit to spinoffs is to increase the performance of Islamic 
banking industry. But, from the Islamic banking statistics that is 
published by the Bank of Indonesia show that after the spinoffs 
policy applied, the financial ratio of Islamic banking industry is 
still fluctuating. Even in recent years, there is a decline in some 
financial ratio of Islamic banking industry, such as the declining 
return on assets and equity; the increasing of non-performing 
finance; and the declining efficiency ratio. This factindicatesthat 
thespinoffspolicy,which isone of the reason is to improvethe 
financial performanceof theIslamic bankingindustryis still 
notshowing asignificant effect.
Table2. The Development of Fund, Financing, and Asset of Islamic 
Banking Industry
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Deposit 
Fund 
Growth (%) 
32.67 35.50 31.56 41.84 45.46 51.80 27.81 17.97 7.23 28.64 20.11
Financing 
Growth (%) 34.23 36.69 36.68 22.76 45.42 50.56 43.69 21.54 4.80 16.01 23.98
Asset 
Growth  
(%)
27.98 36.73 35.63 33.37 47.55 49.17 34.06 17.71 6.38 4.04 19.09
Source: Statistic of Islamic Banking, Bank Indonesia
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From the explanation above, we can say that the spinoffs 
policy that was forced by the regulator has still not shown 
a significant effect to accelerate the growth and financial 
performance of Islamic banking industry in Indonesia. Based on 
this fact, the spinoffs policy should evaluated. This research is 
going to evaluate the spinoffs criteria in The Law No. 21 of 2008.
This paper is going to; first, evaluate the spinoff criteria 
by using ARIMA to forecast the shared asset of its subsidiary 
banks to the parent’s banks. Second, perform simulations to 
predict the asset rate of growth that must be achieved by the 
subsidiary to make 50% share asset on its parent’s banks. Third, 
recommended several spinoffs’ criteria that are proper for the 
Islamic business unit spin-off.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Concept of Spin-off
The research about Islamic banks spinoff is still limited, so 
we can use the spinoffs theory from another industry to replicate 
on Islamic banks spin-offs. According to Elfring and Foss (1997), 
there are two types of spin-offs, namely: first, regarding its 
parent company, in which the parent company for any reason is 
not able or not able to exploit the opportunities that come. The 
second type is related to organizational units as an individual; 
this second type is the kind most widely performed, in which the 
subsidiary is not the same as its parent’s company. This second 
category contained in the spinoffs of the Islamic banking units in 
conventional banks in Indonesia.
Chemmanur et al. (2014) analyze the effect of the spin-off on 
performance that is measured by productivity. They find how (the 
precise channel and mechanism), where (parent and subsidiary), 
and when (the dynamic pattern) efficiency improvements arise 
on the subsequent spin-off. Another result that they find out is 
that the spin-off increases total factor productivity, while the 
post spin-off productivity can be attributed to cost saving, the 
plant that is spun-off do not underperform parent plants before 
the spin-off, and the independent spun-off entities show greater 
improvements in productivity compared to related spun-off 
entities.
Kleppler and Thompson (2010) built the new theory 
about the intra-industry spin-offs that based on disagreement. 
The paper focused on what can learn about intra-industry 
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spinoffs from accumulating statistical regularities and leading 
case studies. The result showed that a theory of conflicts born 
from the inherent difficulties in evaluating new ideas by 
decision-maker. We can use this paper as an argument why the 
Islamic business unit should spinoffs from their conventional 
bank parent. One of the arguments is because of the differences 
between the Islamic bank characteristics and conventional bank 
so that it will lead the disagreement in Islamic business unit with 
their conventional bank parent.
Islamic Banking
According to Islamic Banking Law No. 21 of 2008, Islamic 
banking defined as everything concerning about the Islamic full-
fledge Bank and Islamic Business Unit, covering institutional, 
business activities, as well as the manner and process of carrying 
out its business activities. From this definition, there is two 
institutions in the Indonesian Islamic banking namely Islamic 
full-fledged and Islamic business unit. The emergence of these 
two bodies in Islamic banking in Indonesia relates to the dual 
banking system adopted in the banking system in Indonesia.
In 2008, the Law No. 21 of 2008 concerning Islamic Banking 
published. The Law No. 21 of 2008 is a special law regulating 
Islamic banking industry. Before the Law No. 21 of 2008 was 
established, there were several regulations concerning Islamic 
banks in Indonesia. There were the Law No. 7 of 1992 and the 
Law No. 10 of 1998. In the Law No. 7 of 1992 about Banking, the 
Islamic banks were defined only as profit sharing banks. The 
next development is the presence of Law No. 10 of 1998 about 
Banking. Law No. 10 of 1998 declared that the banking system in 
Indonesia is adopting a dual banking system. In this law, Islamic 
banking is defined as a bank that is operational with Islamic 
principles.
One of the crucial points in the Law No. 21 of 2008 would 
be the regulation about the Islamic business unit spin-off if they 
fulfilled the criteria. The spin-off rules according to this act are 
when the Islamic business unit has reached the 50% assets of 
its parent banks or have operated for 15 years after this Act 
enactment. After the Act No 21 0f 2008 fully was established, 
several Islamic business units spun-off although they have not 
still fulfilled the criteria based on the Act. This Law has resulted 
in the increasing number of full-fledged Islamic banks. Before, 
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there were only three Islamic full-fledged banks and 26 Islamic 
business unit, but now there are 12 full-fledged Islamic banks 
and 22 Islamic business unit.
Islamic Bank’s Spin-off
There are a few kinds of research that had discussed 
the effect of the spin-off on the performance of its spin-off’s 
banks. Some research has shown that the spinoff decision had 
an impact on the performance of its spin-off’s banks between 
pre and post-spinoff (Nasuha, 2012; Al Arif, 2014; Hamid, 2015). 
Nasuha (2012) finds that only asset, financing, and deposit funds 
that show a difference between before and after spinoffs policies 
on that five banks. Otherwise, for other variables such as CAR, 
FDR, ROA, and ROE, it revealed that there was no difference on 
CAR, FDR, ROA, and ROE in Islamic banks. Al Arif (2014) finds 
that the spinoff had a positive influence on the deposit funds 
at the Islamic banking industry. Hamid (2015) believes that the 
spinoff had positive effects on the profitability in the Islamic 
banking sector.
But, some research has shown that the spinoff decision 
didn’t give an effect of the performance in its spin-off’s banks 
(Al Arif, 2015a; Al Arif, 2015b; Al Arif, 2015c). Al Arif (2015a) 
finds that there are no differences in financing between pre and 
post-spinoff at the spin-off’s banks. Al Arif (2015b) believes that 
the spinoff decision had increased the operational inefficiency 
in the Islamic banking industry. Al Arif (2015c) concludes that 
there is no difference in the asset between pre and post-spinoff 
at the spin-off’s banks.
Rizqullah (2013) conducted a study on the selection 
method of the spinoffs of Islamic business units of conventional 
banks into Islamic banks in Indonesia by using the approach 
of Analytical Network Process (ANP). The research findings 
obtained, the spinoffs method Sharia unit for the establishment 
of Islamic banks by forming a new company is an alternative 
establishment of Islamic banks and is appropriate based on the 
combined judgment of experts and practitioners. The next order 
of alternative strategy is a spinoff by using the agency or company 
that already exists. Alternative establishment of Islamic banks 
to establish new Islamic banks included in the selection process 
intended as a counterweight and at the same time to get a more 
comprehensive input from experts and practitioners.
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RESEARCH METHOD
This paper attempts to exercise the growth of the 
Indonesian Islamic banks, particularly to examine how does 
the Islamic banks can achieve the Islamic banks of 50% share 
assets. In particular, by using an econometrics tool namely, 
Autoregressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA). ARIMA 
is a forecast method that emphasizes on the behavior of time 
series of a variable without observing any other variables. We 
use ARIMA to estimates expect the 50% share asset that can 
achieve in 2023. The variable that is going to predict is the shared 
asset of Islamic banking units from their conventional parent 
banks. The research objects of this study are five Islamic banking 
units. The following banks are Bank of CIMB Niaga, Bank of 
Permata, Bank of BTN, Bank of DKI, and Bank of North Sumatra 
(Sumut)). These banks were chosen because they represent the 
state-owned bank (Bank of BTN), the regional development 
banks (Bank of DKI and Bank of North Sumatra), and the private 
banks (Bank of CIMB Niaga and Bank of Permata). Besides that, 
we are also using Four full-fledged Islamic banks that resulted 
from spinoffs. The following banks are Bank of BNI Sharia, Bank 
of BRI Sharia, Bank of BJB Sharia, and Bank of Bukopin Sharia. 
We were also using two banks that spinoff before the Islamic 
Banking Act, such as Bank of Sharia Mandiri and Bank of Mega 
Sharia.
ARIMA model is employed to exercise the shared asset 
of Islamic banks and generate the estimated shared asset. 
Historically, ARIMA was first developed by Box and Jenkins 
in 1976, and unlike the structural model which composes of 
some independent variables, ARIMA employs autoregressive 
(AR), moving average (MA) in an integrated order term. AR(p) 
is describing dependent variable (Yt) based on its past (lag) 
value (of order p) or the same as the dynamic model. AR is also 
commonly referred to as the one that uses the lag value of the 
residual of the regression. On other hand, MA (q) is explaining 
dependent variable (Yt) based on past values of the error terms 
(εt), which are the moving average of previous error terms of 
order q added into mean values of Yt. MA is also commonly said 
as the one that occupies lag value of forecast error to improve 
current estimate (Ismal, 2011). The process of autoregressive 
model AR(p) is represented by:
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 yt = φ1 yt-1 + φ2 yt-2 + ... + φpyt-p + δ + et    
 (1)
The process of moving average MA(q) is represented by:
yt = µ + et - θ1 et-1 - θ2 et-2 - ... - θq et-q      
(2)
The process of modeling with ARIMA approach follows 
four steps, which are namely; first, identification of variables; 
second, estimation of the model; third, model evaluation; fourth, 
model forecasting. In the identification step, a series investigated 
whether it has a seasonal pattern or not; stationary or non-
stationary and; the model of the autocorrelation function (ACF) 
and partial autocorrelation function (PACF). The unit root test is 
carried out to check stationarity of every variable. The unit root 
test that used in this paper is Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF).
Next, the estimation step will find out the most robust 
estimated model combining AR and MA or both of them. There 
are at least three patterns commonly found in ARIMA model. 
First, correlogram test which produces zero value in all periods 
of auto-correlation function (ACF = 0) namely the white noise 
ACF function. Second,  correlogram test which shows cut off 
ACF pattern (usually) between the first period of autocorrelation 
function and the second or third one. Third, correlogram test 
with a decreasing pattern of ACF from the beginning of the 
period until the end of the period,  namely dying down pattern 
(Ismal, 2011).
The model evaluation step conducts some diagnostic 
test to check the accuracy of the estimated model and the actual 
one such as residual test, the coefficient of variables. Finally, the 
forecasting step produces future data of every model under two 
assumptions, which are: (a) linear prediction and; (b) selected 
model with the most efficient variables (Ismal, 2011).
Besides that, this research also used the descriptive 
analysis using an in-depth interview with the regulator and 
bankers. The participants were appointed to represent the 
regulator is the parties who are involved in drafting legislation. 
Whereas the bankers consist of the banker who came from the 
subsidiary Islamic banks and bankers from the parent banks. 
The descriptive analysis is used to support the practical result 
of ARIMA. This study also used a simulation to predict the 
asset growth per year that is achieved by all sample banks to 
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reach 50% of share asset from their parents. The simulation uses 
compound growth assumption.
RESULT AND DISCUSSION
The first stage in the ARIMA process is the stationary test 
using the unit root test. The unit root test uses the Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller. The first test was carried out at the level if not 
stationary in a stationary level it will be tested at the level of the 
first difference. The test results with test ADF at Bank of BNI 
Sharia, Bank of BRI Sharia, Bank of BJB Sharia, Bank of Bukopin 
Sharia, Bank of Sharia Mandiri, Bank of Mega Sharia, Bank 
of CIMB Niaga Sharia, Bank of Permata Sharia, Bank of BTN 
Sharia, Bank of DKI Sharia, and Bank of North Sumatra Sharia 
shows that the data being not stationary at the current level. 
Also, because the data is not stationary at the current level, then 
stationary was tested at the first difference. The stationary test 
with the unit root test showed a significant result that it might 
be said that the data had been stationary at the first difference.
Then, we will see the correlogram. First, we will see the 
correlogram of the Auto-Correlation (AC) function. We will get 
the lag for Moving Average (MA) model. Next, we will see the 
correlogram for the partial auto-correlation (PAC) function. We 
will get the optimum lag for auto-regressive (AR) model. To 
get the best model is based on the goodness of fit of the model 
by using the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Schwarz 
Criterion (SC). After the goodness of fit of the model is done, 
next we will use the ARIMA for forecasting according to the 
purpose of this research.
Table 3. The Lag of AR and MA Process
Bank AR Stationary MA ARIMA
1 BNI Sharia (BNIS) 1 First difference 1 (1, 1, 1)
2 BRI Sharia (BRIS) 1 First difference 1 (1, 1, 1)
3 BJB Sharia (BJBS) 1 First difference 1 (1, 1, 1)
4 Bukopin Sharia (BSB) 1
First 
difference 1 (1, 1, 1)
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5 Bank of Sharia Mandiri (BSM) 1
First 
difference 1 (1, 1, 1)
6 Bank of Mega Sharia (BMS) 1
First 
difference 1 (1, 1, 1)
7 Bank of CIMB Niaga (CIMB) 2
First 
difference 1 (2, 1, 1)
8 Bank of Permata (Prmt) 2
First 
difference 1 (2, 1, 1)
9 Bank of BTN (BTN) 1 First difference 3 (1, 1, 3)
10 Bank of  DKI (DKI) 1 First difference 1 (1, 1, 1)
11 Bank of Sumut (Su-mut) 1
First 
difference 1 (1, 1, 1)
The predicted result showed that all of the sample banks 
couldn’t achieve the 50% share asset from their parent’s banks, 
either the Islamic banking unit or Islamic full-fledged banks. 
The highest forecasting value is an Islamic banking unit of Bank 
of BTN, and the lowest predicted value is Bank of BRI Sharia. 
This result implies there are no Islamic banking unitthat can’t 
fulfill the spin-off’s criteria which Islamic business units had an 
obligation to spin-off if the asset of the Islamic business unit has 
reached 50% of the parent bank’s assets. 
Next, we are going to do the simple simulation using 
compound growth. Table 5 shows that the banks must have 
an asset growth approximately 31.73% every year (with 5% 
assumption of parent’s banks) if they are going to achieve the 
50% shared asset. Or, they must have 37.65% every year (with the 
10% assumption of parent’s banks). The highest annual growth 
target is Bank of BRI Sharia that must have annual growth 
45% (with 5% assumption) and 52.1% (with 10% assumption). 
The lowest annual growth target is Bank of Mega Sharia that 
must have annual growth 21.5% (with the 5% assumption) and 
annual growth 27.3% (with 10% assumption). However, this 
increase target is hard to achieve because, in fact, the common 
development of the parent’s banks is larger than 10% every year.
From the ARIMA and simulation result, we can conclude 
that the spin-off’s criteria are almost impossible to achieve. 
Both the subsidiary banks (including the spin-off’s banks) and 
the parent’s banks are growing every year. If the subsidiary 
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banks want to meet the 50% share asset target, they must have 
a growth rate approximately 37% a year. The growth that is too 
high can lead to the emergence of risk in Islamic banks because 
one strategy to achieve higher asset growth is by pushing the 
financial growth. The financial growth that is too high can lead 
to the increasing of non-performing financing in Islamic banks.
Table 4. Summary of Shared Assets
Bank Current Year (2014)
Predicted Value 
(2023)
1 BNI Sharia (BNIS) 4,95% 9.00%
2 BRI Sharia (BRIS) 2,62% 4.00%
3 BJB Sharia (BJBS) 8,68% 11.00%
4 Bukopin Sharia (BSB) 6,89% 7.00%
5 Bank of Sharia Mandiri (BSM) 8,86% 11.00%
6 Bank of Mega Sharia (BMS) 10,56% 12.00%
7 Bank of CIMB Niaga (CIMB) 3,73% 8.00%
8 Bank of Permata (Prmt) 8,66% 10.00%
9 Bank of BTN (BTN) 7,71% 18.00%
10 Bank of  DKI (DKI) 9,29% 8.00%
11 Bank of Sumut (Sumut) 7,77% 12.00%
 According to the forecasting result of asset shares of the 
Islamic banks, we can explain several things as follows, such as; 
first, if there are no condition changes either from the internal or 
external side so that no Islamic banks can achieve the 50% share 
asset from its parent’s banks.  Second, the spin-off’s criteria 
should evaluate, because it can predict that no one of the Islamic 
business units can achieve the 50% share assets from its parent’s 
banks. Third, the growth of Islamic banks should be larger than 
the parent’s banks growth if the Islamic banks want to achieve 
the 50% share assets from its parent’s banks.
This result also supported by the in-depth interview from 
the bankers and the policymakers that made the Islamic banks 
act. From the manager’s perspective, the entire respondent 
said that it’s almost impossible the Islamic banking unit can 
achieve the 50% market share of its parent banks. Besides that, 
they also stated that the 15 year’s criteria could only use for 
the Islamic banking unit that owned by the state and private 
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enterprises. It will become a problem for Islamic banking unit 
that is held by the district government because almost all of the 
assets of the district government banks is relatively small. From 
the policymaker perspective, the criteria were drawn up by 
reasonable assumption only. The 50% market share assets based 
on the majority reason, if the asset of Islamic banking unit had 
already achieved the 50% share assets of its parent’s bank, they 
should do the spinoff. But in reality, it’s almost impossible for 
the Islamic banking unit to achieve the 50% share assets of its 
parent banks.  
Table 5. Simulation Result
 
Growth Assumption 
of Islamic Banks
Growth Assumption 
of Parent’s Banks
Estimation of 
Share Asset
BNIS 36.50% 5.00% 50.69%
42.80% 10.00% 50.06%
BRIS 45.00% 5.00% 50.53%
52.10% 10.00% 50.18%
BSB 32.00% 5.00% 50.70%
38.10% 10.00% 50.09%
BJBS 31.00% 5.00% 51.16%
37.00% 10.00% 50.37%
BTN 30.00% 5.00% 52.69%
35.50% 10.00% 50.34%
Permata 28.00% 5.00% 51.47%
33.70% 10.00% 50.12%
CIMB 
Niaga 41.00% 5.00% 52.95%
47.00% 10.00% 50.69%
DKI 27.00% 5.00% 51.47%
32.70% 10.00% 50.27%
Sumut 30.00% 5.00% 53.08%
35.30% 10.00% 50.04%
BSM 27.00% 5.00% 51.47%
32.70% 10.00% 50.27%
BMS 21.50% 5.00% 50.25%
27.30% 10.00% 50.30%
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Average 31.73% 5.00%
37.65% 10.00%
Acep R Jayaprawira (former Director of Bank of BNI 
Sharia) and Shidiq Haryono (Branch head of Bank of CIMB Niaga 
Sharia) said that the share assets Criterion’s hard to achieve by 
the Islamic business unit because either the subsidiary banks 
or parent’s banks are growing every year. Ariawan Amin (the 
former CEO of Bank of Jabar Banten Sharia) said that the core 
idea of the spin-off policy is to accelerate the Islamic banking 
growth, especially the sharia business unit. In fact, the policy 
maker encourages the spin-off to do despite the internal 
conditions of Islamic business unit being not yet possible. 
Table 6. The Assets and Shared Assets of Islamic Banks
No Banks Asset (million US$) Share asset (%)
1 BNIS 1,499.39 4.95
2 BRIS 1,564.87 2.62
3 Bukopin Sharia 397.19 6.89
 4 BJBS 468.53 8.68
5 Bank of CIMB Niaga 650.95 3.73
6 Bank of Permata 1,232.51 8.66
7 Bank of BTN 857.29 7.71
8 Bank of DKI 260.38 9.29
9 Bank of Sumut 139.71 7.77
10 Bank of Danamon 222.89 1.77
11 Bank of BII 552.24 5.31
12 Bank of OCBC NISP 192.48 2,43
13 Bank of Yogyakrt 28.21 4.69
14 Bank of BPD Jateng 73.89 2.28
15 Bank of BPD Jatim 95.94 3.28
16 Bank of BPD Jambi 14.74 3.31
17 Bank of BPD Aceh 185.31 12.77
18 Bank of Sumbar 94.20 6.80
19 Bank of BPD Riau 77.98 4.43
20 Bank of Sumsel 78.61 6.36
21 Bank of Kalsel 45.23 5.43
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22 Bank of Kalbar 92.27 10.69
23 Bank of Kaltim 85.41 3.74
24 Bank of Sulselbar 55.76 7.25
25 Bank of NTB 29.46 6.60
26 Bank of Sinarmas 151.78 9.28
Source: The Banks Publication Report
Assumption: US$ 1 = IDR 13,000
From the in-depth interview with the bankers of Islamic 
banks and regulators, it suggested several alternative spin-off 
criteria, such as: (1) the capital aspect. According to the Islamic 
Banking Law, the minimum capital of new Islamic banks is 
one trillion rupiahs, so we can also implement this law, which 
is that every Islamic business unit that decides to do the spin-
off must have a minimum capital of one trillion rupiahs. (2) 
The minimum asset of Islamic business unit. According to the 
Subarjo Joyosumarto (the former Deputy Governor of Bank of 
Indonesia), the lowest asset of Islamic business unit to do the 
spinoff is 10 trillion rupiahs. (3) The performance of Islamic 
business unit. (4) The commitment of the parent’s banks.
Johnson et al. (1994); Hite and Owers (1984) said one 
key factor of spinoff process is the size of its parent company. 
The higher the parent’s business assets value, the greater 
chances for success. If we relate this to the condition of the 
Indonesian Islamic banking industry, which is almost all 
the Islamic business units being owned by the regional 
development banks, that have a small size, it will become a 
problem if the Islamic business unit decided to do the spinoff. 
One big problem that they face is the liquidity risk; they will be 
difficult to find out the funding resources because the parent 
banks can’t help them.
Tubke (2005) and Lindholm-Dahlstrand (2000) had 
said one factor that determined the successful spin-off is the 
relationship between the parent company and its subsidiaries. 
Klepper and Thompson (2010) found that the businesses that 
have better performance before spin-off would have a better 
performance after the spin-off. According to this, the sharia 
business unit must have a better performance before they make 
a spin-off so that after that they can have a better performance. 
Thus, the parent banks should support the sharia business 
unit to have a better performance before they make a spin-off.
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The regulator, in this case, is the Financial Service 
Authority, should focus on the growth and development of the 
sound Islamic banks and not just a larger number of Islamic 
banks. The spinoff is not the final objective of Islamic banking 
growth, but the spinoff is one of the strategies to achieve the 
higher market share. The spinoff criteria should not just only 
be based on the shared asset or the time but should base on 
the size of its Islamic business unit. According to the data, 
almost the assets of the Islamic business unit is below one 
trillion rupiahs, if they are forced to do the spinoff in the mid 
of 2023 years it will impact on their performance. Besides that, 
the ability of profit creation of the Islamic business unit is still 
weak. According to the data, only several Islamic business 
units can have a profit above 100 billion rupiahs. If they are 
doing the spinoff, the profit will decline significantly, because 
there will increase in operational cost after the spinoff. The 
next things that should consider according to these spinoff 
criteria are most of the Islamic business unit owned by the 
Regional Development Bank, which has limited capital. It is 
also pertinent to state it here that if the Islamic business unit 
is forced to do the spinoff, there will an adverse impact on 
Islamic business unit if they faced a liquidity problem or 
another problem because the size of its parents is also small.
Haribowo (2017) found that there are no Islamic business units 
owned by regional development banks can achieve the spin-
off criteria.
The spinoff decision should base on the restricted 
studies. According to Al Arif (2015a), the spinoff decision 
doesn’t have an impact on financing growth. Al Arif (2015b) 
said that the spinoff decision increases the operational 
inefficiency in spin-off’s banks. Al Arif (2015c) also finds that 
spinoff decision doesn’t have an impact on asset growth. From 
this research, it was found that the spinoff policy that is forced 
by the regulator can make the development of the Indonesian 
Islamic banking to decline. Also, because many of the Islamic 
business units only have a little asset and capital, if they had 
to do the spin-off, it could make the size of the Indonesian 
Islamic banking industry smaller than before. 
Spin-off policy is only one of the strategies that can 
use to accelerate the growth of the Islamic banking industry. 
Besides that, merger can also as another strategies to industrial 
acceleration (Miftah and Wibowo, 2017). The horizontal 
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mergers led to increased market power (Prager and Hannan, 
1998). Mergers and acquisitions had been an important strategy 
for the Greek banking sector (Antoniadis et.al, 2014).
CONCLUSION
The forecasting result shows that there are no Islamic 
banks, either full-fledged Islamic banks nor Islamic business unit 
can reach the 50% asset of its conventional parent banks after 15 
years the Law No. 21 of 2008 applied. From this result, it can 
say that the spinoffs criteria of the Indonesian Islamic banking 
industry must revise. The regulator such as the Financial Service 
Authority (OJK) must make a strong standard for the Islamic 
business unit spin-offs into full-fledged Islamic banks, such 
as the nominal asset, profit, and financial ratio of the Islamic 
business unit. The parent bank must prepare the spinoff process 
of the Islamic business unit carefully. The spinoff policy is just 
a policy to achieve a larger market share of Islamic banking 
industry and not the final objective of Islamic banking industry 
development.
A spin-off of the Islamic banking sector in Indonesia can 
be a role model for Islamic bank’s spin-off for other countries. 
Also, the spin-off of the Islamic banking industry in Indonesia 
can be one reference to the spin-off of the banking sector in other 
nations. A strict standard to be the primary reference in the spin-
off process of Islamic banks.
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